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JOHN LOCKE IN THE GERMAN
ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION
BY KLAUSP. FISCHER

I. A favoriteassumptionof Anglo-Americanscholarship,endlessly
repeated in textbooks and monographs,is that Locke's philosophy
triumphed in every nook and cranny of Western Europe. By implication,it is also assumedthat other philosophicsystems, especially
those of Descartes and Leibniz, withered away without much opposition. The reigningphilosophyof the Enlightenment,we are told,
was that of Locke and his disciples in Englandand on the Continent.
Some have gone so far as to claim that Locke's "influencepervadesthe
eighteenthcenturywith an almost scripturalauthority."'
Examining the philosophic traditions of individual nations in
eighteenth-centuryEurope,one encountersa slightlydifferentpicture.
Takingthe GermanEnlightenmentas an example,this essay is meant
to dispute,if not destroy, the exaggeratedimportanceascribedto John
Lockein eighteenth-centuryEurope.
In France Locke faced the formidable Cartesian system; in
Germany he encounteredan almost insurmountableobstacle in the
Leibniz-Wolffschool.2It has been observedthat in GottfriedWilhelm
Leibniz(1646-1716) the Germans had a Newton and a Locke rolled
into one-that is to say, Leibnizwas at once a great scientist and a
philosopher.3He was the fatherof Germanphilosophyas surelyas Descartes was the founderof Frenchphilosophy.He was not only aperpetuum mobile of science, but the true preceptor of the German nation.
Every foreign philosophy, therefore, had to reckon with the authority of
Leibniz, and after his death with that of Christian Wolff (1679-1754),

who endowedLeibniz'sthoughtwiththe espritde systeme. The LeibnizWolffschool exercisedan almost iron grip on Germanphilosophyfrom
1680-1750.4This success was due, in large part, to Wolff's pedagogic
skill in systematizingLeibniziandoctrines;in doing this, Wolff at once
satisfiedthe deepurge of the Germanmindfor orderand the scholastic
'Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century
(New York, 1929), 16.
2Aram Vartanian, in his brilliant work, Diderot and Descartes, has demonstrated
the persistent influence of Descartes in the French Enlightenment. Much credit is due
him for modifying the exaggerated view of Locke's importance in eighteenth-century
France.
3A. Wolfstieg, "Englischer und Franz6sischer Deismus und die Deutsche Aufklarung," Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft, 17 (May 1908), 145.
4For the triumph of the Wolffians in the German universities: Max Wundt, Die
deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der A ufkldrung (Tiibingen, 1945).
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tenor of Germanphilosophy.The results were amazing:Wolffs fame
spreadlike wildfireand his disciplescapturedmost universitypositions
in Germany.Accordingto one source,therewere 231 literaryfiguresin
1738who officiallyacknowledgedWolffas theirpreceptor.5
Wolff expoundedan abstract rationalismthat soon pervadedother
fields besides philosophy. The literary counterpart to Wolff, for
example, was JohannChristophGottsched(1700-66), whose influence
equalled-perhaps even surpassed-that of Wolff. Not until both men
passedfrom the scenein the late 1750'scould any rivalmodeof thought
hopeto winthe allegianceof Germanphilosophersor menof letters.
Therewas, of course, some oppositionto Wolffianismduringits hegemony from 1720-50. This opposition emanated from Christian
Thomasius(1655-1728)andhis followers.Thomasiusdevelopedan empirical theory of knowledgeloosely similar to that of Locke. This resemblancehas caused considerablespeculationabout Thomasius'indebtednessto his Englishcounterpart.6Since both thinkerswrote at
about the same time, this questionof "influence"may neverbe settled
conclusively.One fact, however,seems fairlycertain:Locke's common
sense temper, especiallyin religion,seems to have promptedThomasius to returnto his earlierpositionof secularempiricism-a position
from whichhe had been temporarilydeflectedby Pietism.7Thomasius
always spoke approvinglyof Locke's philosophy,whose secular and
empirical tenor reinforcedhis own philosophicoutlook. He was by
nature a rebelliousspirit, eager to eradicatethe remnantsof scholasticism and to provideknowledgewith a purely secular and empirical
basis. In practice,however,he was not able to removeall the vestigesof
tradition;and,like Luther's,his reformingspiritoften veileda stubborn
streak of conservatism. This was most apparent in his moral
philosophy,radicallydifferentfrom Locke's eudaemonistic-utilitarian
ethics. It is well to recall that Thomasius lived in a differentsocial
milieu than Locke's. German thinkers,bound by encrustedmedieval
socio-economic conditions, still accepted moral values which the
Englishhad alreadyoutgrown:avoidanceof risks andexcessiveprofits,
rejection of competition and self-advancement,and abstention from
social or politicalaspirations.A paradeof Germanmoralists,including
SQuoted by Carl Justi, Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen (Leipzig, 1923), I, 78.
6The similarity between Thomasius and Locke is noted briefly by Walter Bienert,
Die Philosophie des Christian Thomasius (Halle, 1934), 11; Cay von Brockdorff, Die
Deutsche Aufkldrungs-Philosophie (Munich, 1926), 42; Gustav Zart, Einfluss der englischen Philosophen seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts
(Berlin, 1881), Pt. 3, Ch. 1; Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der
Aufkldrung (Tiibingen, 1945), 31-32; and Erik Wolf, Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (TiUbingen,1939), 329.
7Thomasius' return to a more temperate and rationalistic religion came after he
read Locke's chapter on "Enthusiasm" (IV, 19), added to the fourth edition of the
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700).
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Thomasius,continuedto propoundethical systems based on altruistic
love, stoic isolation,andpsychologicalquietude.8
Broughtup in a backwardsocial environmentcharacterizedby religious superstition, political repression, and economic stagnation,
Thomasiuscould not be expected to embrace modernityin quite the
same way in whichhis EnglishcounterpartLockepursuedit. His moral
and politicalideas, reflectingGermanconditions,differmarkedlyfrom
those of Locke. In his politicalphilosophy,for example,Thomasiuswas
a proponentof "enlightenedabsolutism."The ideal of constitutional
government,whichhe thoughtincompatiblewith man'scorruptnature,
he classifiedunder"sick forms of government."9
It wouldbe misleading,however,to singleout the traditionalismof
Germansociety as the only obstacle to Lockeanideas. Thomasiuswas
not the best spokesmanfor Locke'sphilosophy.He was by professiona
jurist and pursuedphilosophicalproblems only as an avocation. His
philosophicaltreatises were little more than practical manuals, designedto turn younggentlemeninto civilizedhumanbeings.Compared
to Wolffs imposingtomes, the worksof Thomasiusappearpathetically
slender.In place of magnificentcategories,divisions,and subdivisions,
Thomasius offered a few common sense maxims (Handgriffe). In
choosing this popular mannerof exposition, he committed a serious
tactical error: by side-steppingall philosophicalcomplexities,he lost
his opportunityto establishan academictraditionthat mighthavebeen
able to compete with the reigningschool of abstract rationalism.As it
was, his empiricismhardlymade a ripplein the vast sea of Germanrationalism. In eighteenth-centuryGermany, we must remember,the
success or failure of a philosophicsystem dependedlargely on three
factors: the influenceof its author in the academic community, the
mannerof its exposition, and the quality of its disciples. Thomasius'
philosophy failed on all three counts. The academic world, still
thoroughlyscholastic and traditional,regardedhim as a bete noire because he had nothing but contempt for its traditionalassumptions.10
His popular and eclectic treatment of ideas was also bound to be
ineffective in a scholarly community which prized the "spirit of
thoroughness"(Geist der Grundlichkeit,as Kant called it). As to
Thomasius'followers, they were epigoni,who exercisedlittle influence
on Germanthought. Thomasius'studentsgenerallyswelledthe ranks
of the obedientcivil servantsand becamecautiouslegalists. Only a few
followers of Thomasius, such as JohannFranz Buddeus(1667-1729),
8The best treatment of this moral dimension in the German Enlightenment may be
found in Hans M. Wolff, Die Weltanschauung der deutschen Aufkliirung in Geschichtlicher Entwicklung (Berne, 1963).
9For a fine discussion of Thomasius' political philosophy: F. M. Barnard, "The
Practical Philosophy of Christian Thomasius," JHI, 32 (April-June 1971), 221-46.
l'Walter Bienert (Die Philosophie des Christian Thomasius, 74) observes that an
"icy silence" descended upon Thomasius' thought after his death.
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NicholausHieronymusGundling(1671-1729),AndreasRidiger (16731731), and ChristianAugust Crusius(1715-75), pursuedan academic
career. These men, however,were utterly ineffectivein stemming the
tide of Wolffianism.In spiteof some effortsto combatWolffianism,the
numberof the Thomasiansdeclinedas that of the Wolffiansrose. By
1740, at the height of Wolff's power, the Thomasianshave practically
disappearedandtheirtextbookshavebeenforgotten.1
It was among the Thomasians,then, that Lockean ideas were for
the first time seriouslystudiedin Germany.The weaknessof the Thomasian oppositionto Wolff, however,made it very difficultfor Locke to
get a fair hearing. Locke's first appearancein Germany, therefore,
passedlargelyunnoticed.From 1704to 1754(from the death of Locke
to the death of Wolff) Locke was a quietsubterraneanforce in German
philosophy,overshadowedby the Leibniz-Wolffschool.
II. In the 1740's and 1750's the rationalisticsystems of Wolff and
Gottsched experiencedtheir first setbacks. Under the influence of
Pietism, English empiricism, and middle-class sentimentality
(Empfindsamkeit),latent dissatisfactionwith abstractrationalismnow
broke out into the open. The rationalistic mode of thought was
challenged from several points of view by Germany's poets,
philosophers,andartists.
The first, and perhapsthe most serious, attack againstWolff took
place within the Berlin Academy.12Founded by Leibniz, who also
served as its first president, the Berlin Academy had reached the
heights of prestigeand effectivenessunder Frederickthe Great. From
the beginning,Frederickhoped that the Wolffians and Newtonians
could be made to cooperatewithinthe Academy.13He was sadlydisappointed. When the famous French scientist Pierre-LouisMoreau de
Maupertuis(1698-1759),a Newtonianand a swornenemyof Wolff,became presidentof the Academy the battle betweenEnglishphilosophy
and Germanphilosophywas joined. On the Newtonian(Lockean)side
were rangedMaupertuis,LeonhardEuler(1707-83), andJohannHeinrich Lambert(1728-77); on the Wolffianside the most importantmen
were GeorgeSulzer(1720-79), Samuel Formey(1711-97), and Johann
Philipp Heinius (d. 1775).14
"Gustav Zart, Einfluss der englischen Philosophen seit Bacon auf die deutsche
Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1881), 60.
12For an excellent account of the prolonged and bitter controversy between the
Wolffians and the Newtonians in the Berlin Academy: Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der
Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vol. I, Bk. 2, Ch. 2
(Berlin, 1900). There is also a fine article on the Newton-Wolff controversy by Ronald
S. Calinger, "The Newtonian-Wolffian controversy, 1740-1759," JHI, 30 (July-Sept.
1969), 319-30.
3Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie, I, 254.
14Though Euler and Lambert were ranged on the Newtonian side, it must not be inferred from this that they were also Lockeans. Both men displayed a readiness to ap-
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The year 1747 marked the openingengagement.In that year, the
Academy posed, as the subject of its annualprize essay, the question
whether monads had a foundation in reality.15The decision went
againstWolffwhenthe first prizewas awardedto a relativelyunknown
legal scholar,who had delivereda scathingcritiqueof monads.A much
more seriousbattle, this time involvingthe prestigeof Leibnizhimself,
brokeout in 1751.The chiefprotagonistswere SamuelKonig,a leading
Dutch mathematician,and Maupertuis.Konigsubmitteda manuscript
in which he criticizedthe "Principede la moindreaction," a principle
Maupertuisclaimedto have discovered.Not only did Konigprovethat
Maupertuis'principle-as he stated it-was erroneous,but also that
Leibnizhad alreadydiscoveredthe correct principle.It was especially
the assertion that he had been anticipatedby Leibnizthat infuriated
Maupertuis, and he demanded documentation. Konig, however,
possessedonly a copy of Leibniz'sstatementandwas unableto produce
the original.The Academy, asked to judge the case, took Maupertuis'
side, declaringKonig'scopiedletter a forgery.16Things,of course, did
not rest here. Voltaire subsequently entered the fray against
Maupertuis,and the episodeendedwith inconclusiveresults, thoughit
proved, if anything, that very great men could make great fools of
themselves.
The significance of these struggles in terms of the Lockean
philosophy,however,was far ranging.Wolff's prestige was seriously
questionedwithinandwithoutthe Academy.But as long as Maupertuis
was president(1746-59) the Newtonianshad the upperhand;and this
dominationcontinuedas long as the foreignelement held the reins of
power.
The Wolffiansystem, then, was subjectedto prolongedand intensive critiquesin the 1750'sand 1760's. Even the most faithfuldisciples
of Wolff, most notablyAlexanderBaumgarten(1714-62), G. F. Meier
(1718-77), and Martin Knutzen(1720-56), began to transform their
preciate sense phenomena, but retained a great deal of their Leibniz-Wolff heritage. In
some ways they advanced beyond either Locke or Leibniz to Kant's point of view. Both
attacked Wolff in the Academy for his views on natural science, not for his other philosophic efforts.
'5The exact text of the 1747 question reads as follows: "On demande, qu'en commencant par exposer d'une maniere exacte et nette la doctrine des Monades, on
examine si d'un c6te elles peuvent etre solidement refutees et detruites par des arguments sans replique;ou si de l'autre on est en etat, apres avoir prouve les Monades, d'en
d6duire une explication intelligible des principaux phenomenes de l'Univers, et en particulier de l'origine et du mouvement des corps."
'6Maupertuis' behavior made a very unfavorable impression on the Academy. To
judge as a forgery a letter it had never seen in the original is not exactly sound scientific
procedure. Maupertuis' victory was pyrrhic: apart from arousing the ire of the
Leibnizeans within and without the Academy, Maupertuis soon had to reckon with
Voltaire, who devastated him with his polemical prowess.
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master's system by laying greater emphasis on its empirical and
practical aspects. Wolff himself had always insisted that philosophy
must not be separatedfrom the practicalworld,andhe had followedup
this conviction by paying due respect to empirical elements in his
psychology and epistemology. This explains why his rationalismapAll objects, Wolff said, shouldbe viewed
pearedas two-dimensional.17
in terms of immutableas well as of probabletruths-that is to say, for
each field of realitythere exists a knowledgeof metaphysicalconcepts
and of empiricalfacts. The two dimensionswere to complementeach
other, though Wolff clearly thought the metaphysicalof greater validity. Still, he was never tired of repeatingthat there are two ways of
knowing:by experienceand by reason.In psychology,for example,we
must proceedin two ways, using a rationalisticpsychologyto discover
the metaphysicalconcepts of the soul and an empiricalpsychologyto
provetheirfactuality.
In practice,Wolff was unableto maintaina radicaldualismof two
The result of his endeavorto developa raseparateways of knowing.18
tionalisticepistemologybasedon empiricalfoundationswas that his rationalism was frequentlyat odds with his empiricism.This was most
notoriousin his psychology,and provedto be a source of embarrassmentto his disciples.
These weaknesseswere noted by Wolff's opponents,who promptly
exploitedthe concessionshe had madeto empiricism.In the 1760'shis
system was slowly transformedinto a kind of populareclecticism.'1
The following developments contributed toward the dilution of
Wolffian rationalism: (1) his rationalistic epistemology became
overshadowedby the concessionshe had made to empiricism,(2) his
scholastic mode of philosophizingwas abandonedin favor of more informal modesof argumentation,and (3) his rigorousanalytic-synthetic
methodwas replacedby one of common senseor "soundreasoning."
III. The breakdownof Wolffian rationalismgave Locke a new,
thoughnot a permanent,lease on life in Germany.For approximately
two decades(1755-75) a groupof men,generallyreferredto as Popular
Philosophers (Popularphilosophen),embraced distinctly empirical
modes of thought.They admiredLocke's reasonableness,his emphasis
on sense experience,and his informal style of philosophizing.Their
ideal, perhapsbest expressedin J. J. Engel'swork, "Der Philosophfur
die Welt,"was the gentlemanscholarwho wrote philosophyduringhis
"idle and heavyhours."These "philosophersof the world"believedin
man's reasonablenessand his eventual perfection.They taught their
generationthat this is the best of all possible worlds, that reason will
17WilhelmWindelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (TUbingen, 1957),
395.
18Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, Kant and his Predecessors
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 267.
'9Gustav Zart, Einfluss der Englischen Philosophen, op. cit., 72.
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gradually conquer superstition and ignorance, and that God has
ordered the world in such a way as to increase happinessamong all
righteous men. It was a naive and, at times, trivial credo which the
PopularPhilosopherstaught.20
Locke'sideas, then, were studiedwith renewedinterestaroundmidcenturyby a groupof litterateursknownas PopularPhilosophers.His
religiousideas were taken up by a group within Popular Philosophy
which is often called Neologian, while his educationaltheories were
greatly admiredby that party withinPopularPhilosophywhichstyled
itself "Philanthropinist."Finally, some of his ideas influenceda third
party within Popular Philosophy-the so-called German empiricists.
Though Locke was studiedwith great interest by these men, and was
often cited approvingly,thereis no evidenceto suggestthat the Popular
PhilosopherswereLockean.
The neological movement, comprising such figures as Johann
FriedrichWilhelm Jerusalem (1709-89), August FriedrichWilhelm
Sack (1703-86), JoachimSpalding(1714-1804),GotthilfSamuelSteinbart (1738-1800), and Johann August Eberhard(1739-1809), was at
one with Locke on the simplicity,reasonableness,and, above all, humanenessof Christianity.The Neologiansalso sharedLocke'saversion
to dogmaticsystems. At the same time, practicallyall Neologiansdisliked Locke's overly rationalistictheology,and rightlyperceivedthat it
would lead to a sterile and impersonaldeism. The Neologians were
greatly influenced by the emotional tenor of German Pietism, a
theologicalcast of mind which Locke would have rejectedas another
variety of "enthusiasm." Jerusalem and the German Neologians
believedthat religionwas essentiallya privateexperience-subjectively
felt rather than objectivelydemonstrated.There is a sustainedtone of
enthusiasmand emotionalfervorin GermanNeology whichis conspicuously absent in Locke. Comparedto Jerusalem,Sack, or Spalding,
Locke'stheologyexudesthe rationalspiritof the bankinghouse. Where
Locke, in Leslie Stephen'swords, "plods steadilythroughthe Gospels
and the Acts, accumulatingproof afterproof,"21the Neologiansappeal
steadilyto the heart, to the beauty and harmonyof nature, and to the
certaintyof subjectivefeeling.
The Neologians, then, sharedsome ideas with Locke, but went beyond Lockeanrationalismto a more introspectivetheology.Beginning
in the 1740's,and reachingits fruitionin the last quarterof the century,
German theology and philosophybecame increasinglysubjectiveand
20Many German historians have seized upon the shallow doctrines of the Popular
Philosophers to condemn the whole Aufklirung as trivial. The Popular Philosophers
were indeed trivial, but they do not represent the A ufklirung as a whole. To condemn
the whole movement as "seicht" or "banausich" is to condemn Lessing, Wieland,
Winckelmann, and Kant as trivial-judgments surely no one would wish to make.
21Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York,
1962), I, 80.
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transcendental.The seeds of this developmentare clearly visible in
German Neology. For this reason, one cannot equate Lockean
Latitudinarianismwith German Neology, in spite of several assumptions madeby both.22All in all, Locke's religiousideaswerewell known
by Germantheologians,but neverfoundwidespreadacceptanceoutside
the liberal neological movement. Religious liberalismwas a minority
movementin Germany,limitedto a rathersmall group of theologians,
and religiousorthodoxycontinuedto rule the greaterpart of the populationthroughoutthe Enlightenment.23
Locke's educationalideas, as expressedin his Some ThoughtsConcerningEducation(1693), were more readilyacceptedin Germanythan
his other theories.JohannBernhardBasedow(1723-90), the founderof
the liberalexperimentalschool calledthe DessauPhilanthropinum,was
an ardentfollowerof Locke. The same is true of Basedow'sdisciples,
who are generally called the Philanthropinists.The last will and
testament of the Philanthropinistmovement was the great encyclopedia Allgemeine Revision des gesamten Schul-und Erziehungswesen
von einer Gesellschaft praktischer Erzieher (16 vols., Hamburg, 1785-

92). In this encyclopedia, to which most of the Philanthropinists
contributed, Lockean ideas figure very prominently. The Philanthropinist movement, however, was an evanescent phenomenon,
limitedvery much in space and time. On account of its utilitarianand
anti-classicaltemper it did not materiallyaffect the courseof German
education.The mainstreamof Germaneducationalthought,even at the
heightof the Philanthropinistmovement,was neohumanism,as representedby Gesner,Heyne, Ernesti,or Niethammer.24Locke, to be sure,
was admired for his good sense, his emphasis on doing and
experiencing,and his observationalistmethod. At the same time, his
one-sidedutilitarianism,whichat times amountedto rankphilistinism,
aroused much hostility and ultimately militated against Locke's
widespreadacceptance. The decline of Philanthropinism(Basedow's
Philanthropinumcollapsedin 1793)meant a correspondingdiminution
of interest in Locke. This diminishinginterest in Locke's educational
theorieswas greatlyacceleratedby the influxof Rousseauianideas.The
22Thismisconception is most persistently pursued by Andrew Brown, "John Locke
and the Religious Aufklarung," Review of Religion (Jan. 1949), 126-54.
23The literature in eighteenth-century theology is sizeable, but generally undistinguished. Some of the better studies are: G. R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of
Reason (Cambridge, 1966) and The Church and the Age of Reason, 1648-1789 (New
York, 1961); Karl Aner, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit (Hildesheim, 1961); F. W.
Kantzenbach, Protestantisches Christentum im Zeitalter der Aufklarung (Gtfterloh,
1965); and Wolfgang Philipp, Das Werden der Aufkldrung in theologiegeschichtlicher
Sicht (1957).
24For the role of education in eighteenth-century Germany: Karl Biedermann,
Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1854-80); W. H. Bruford, Germany
in the Eighteenth Century, The Social Background of the Literary Revival (Cambridge,
1965); Oskar Lehmann, Die deutschen moralischen Wochenschriften des achtzehnten
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last two decadesof the eighteenthcenturyin Germanyweredominated
by Rousseau,who overshadowedall other foreignphilosophers,anddid
so bothin the popularityandin the long-rangeimpactof his ideas.
For want of a better word, the men in Germanywho came to the
defense of Locke's philosophymay be called empiricists.The largest
numberof these Lockean admirerscame from the Universityof Gottingen, where sober positivism sustained most academic disciplines.
The most prominent Gottingen empiricists were Johann Heinrich
Feder (1740-1821) and Christoph Meiners (1747-1810). In addition,
there were Gottlob August Tittel (1739-1816), and Johann Friedrich
Flatt (1759-1821), who sympathizedwith the position of Feder and
Meiners. Today, their names have been forgotten and their works
gatherdust in a few Germanuniversitylibraries.Thereis a good reason
for this. These empiricistswerenot only shallowandunsystematic,but
engagedin such a feeblemindedoppositionto Kant that they lost the
The same
supportof the youngergenerationof Germanphilosophers.25
fate befell other German empiricists, though some of them, most
notably DietrichTiedemann(1748-1803) and JohannNicolaus Tetens
(1738-1807),havebeentreatedmorecharitablyby posterity.
The strikingthing about the Germanempiricistswas their unusual
philosophicorientation. Since they were all educated in the LeibnizWolff school of philosophy,they foundit exceedinglydifficultto accept
Englishempiricismin its entirety. Most Germanempiricistsdid not,
like their Englishor Frenchcounterparts,advancebeyondLocke to a
monisticinterpretationof psychic phenomena.Except for such sensationalists as JohannChristianLossius (1743-1813) or Karl Franzvon
Irwing(1728-1801), they refusedto wipe out the Lockeandistinction
between sensation and reflection.The mind, they held, was far more
than a mere heap or collectionof perceptions-a receptacleof discrete
atoms, fortuitouslycombinedby the laws of association.To be sure,
they often used mechanicalmetaphors,but they remainedloyal to the
idealistconceptionof the soul as both containerand producerof ideas.
Behindtheir refusalto dispensewiththe reflectivefacultyin manlurked
a deep-seatedphilosophicconscienceinheritedfrom Leibniz.26Try as
they might, the German empiricists could not abandonthe LeibnizJahrhunderts als padagogische Reformschriften (Leipzig, 1893); Friedrich Paulsen,
Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1896), and Das deutsche
Bildungswesen in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1909).
25Thisfeeble-minded opposition to Kant is especially obvious in the Philosophische
Bibliothek (1788-91), a philosophical journal founded and edited by Meiners and Feder.
26Ithas not been sufficiently stressed that there was a Leibnizean Renaissance in the
late 1760's and the 1770's, following the publication of Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais
(1765). This Leibniz Renaissance was a very real and deeply-felt phenomenon, determining the future course of German history. Cf. Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der A uJkldrung,op. cit., 317ff.
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Wolff modelof a unifying,holistic, andcreativesoul. Indeed,they often
criticizedLocke for minimizingthe dynamicrole playedby the mindin
producingideas.
This stout-hearteddefense of an autonomous soul was characteristic not only of Germanempiricism,but of Germanphilosophyin
general.Superficially,the historyof Germanphilosophyafter 1750appears as a strugglebetweentwo one-sidedviewsof the mind:the innate
modelof Leibnizandthe cash-registermodelexpoundedby Englishand
Frenchsensationalists.Strictly speaking,this impressionis false. Not
eventhe Germanempiricistscouldendorsethe materialisticviewof the
mind. Of course, the GermanempiricistsrejectedLeibniz'stheory of
the self-sufficient monad, which they unanimously regarded as
scientificallyuntenable.The externalworld,they insisted,simplycould
not be separatedfrom the ego, and consequentlyhad to be allowedto
participatein consciousness.Betweenthe ego and the world there is a
constantinterrelationship.Yet this relationship-and here the German
empiricistsrefusedto follow their Englishcounterparts-is not a onesided affair,beginningand endingin sensation. Evenif the materialof
thought is conveyed to the mind via the senses, it must still be registered, compared, united, classified-in short, transformed-by the
minditself. In processingthe data of the senses, the mindimposes its
own characterupon them; and in so doing, displaysits autonomyand
self-activity.
We have here, by the German empiricists themselves, a
reaffirmationof the rationalisticdictum that the senses must be intellectualized.In addition,we find that the Germanempiricistsdenied
the converse,namely,that the intellect must be sensualized.Nothingis
in the intellect, Locke had said, which has not previouslybeen in the
senses-to whichLeibnizaddedthe proviso"Exceptfor the intellectitself." This celebratedstatement,alongwith the Leibnizeancaveat,now
assumed renewed significance. Granted that all of our knowledge
begins with experience,granted, further, that it must justify itself in
experientialterms-the fact still remainsthat it must be validatedby
certain innate faculties of the mind which are transcendent in
character.27

In their attempts to safeguardthe spontaneous,autonomous,and,
in a sense, the transcendentalnatureof the soul, whileat the same time
embracingthe empiricistargument,the Germanempiricistsclearlyreveal their ambiguousposition.Theywantedvery muchto be empiricists
in the English tradition. They hoped to treat the mind accordingto
strict empiricallaws, as set forth in Locke'sEssay ConcerningHuman
Understandingor in Newton's Opticks.Yet, shudderingat the implied
consequences-the exampleof DavidHume's radicalempiricismbeing
ever present to their eyes-they recoiled to a variety of rationalistic
27Thisactive and creative dimension of the soul is especially emphasized by Tetens,
as when he said that "die Seele kann nicht nur ihre Vorstellungen stellen und ordnen,
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positions. We have the curious spectacle, then, of a number of German
empiricists being attracted to English philosophy, while at the same
time holding fast to German idealism. Not even Tetens, the supposed
"German Locke," could accept English empiricism in its entirety, as
his search for a "transcendental" knowledge reveals. In a key passage,
Tetens epitomizes this unique position of German empiricism by saying
that:
The Britishphilosophersmay serve as a model in the field of empiricalobservation,but certainlynot in speculativephilosophy.... It seems to me that
our Leibnizhas fathomed the human mind and its activities, especially in
respect to transcendentalknowledge,to a far greater degree of depth, accuracy,andclaritythanthe conscientiousobservationalistJohnLocke.28
Locke was not only a philosopher, but a major political ideologue.
In point of fact, he is commonly called the founder of modern
liberalism, a theory which is supposed to have been social dynamite in
Western Europe and America. Yet, in Germany his political philosophy
was greeted with universal insouciance-both by those who sympathized with his general philosophic outlook and those who did not.
What accounts for this widespread lack of interest in Locke's political
philosophy? One way to account for it is to recall that the typical form
of government in eighteenth-century Germany was royal absolutism.
With few exceptions, political thinkers glorified the authoritarian structure of society which prevailed everywhere. They owed their very
existence to this order and consequently settled for a policy of splendid
isolation as far as the world of politics was concerned. Intimidated by
power, they preferred to study subjects which were not laden with
political significance. The socio-economic context, then, explains in
large part why they took so little interest in Locke's political writings.
If any English political theorist commanded much respect in
eighteenth-century Germany, it was Thomas Hobbes, not John Locke.
We have seen that Locke exerted little influence in Germany until
the mid-eighteenth century, when his theories were studied with
renewed interest by the Popular Philosophers-by the Neologians, the
Philanthropinists, and the German empiricists. But it cannot be maintained, on that account, that the Popular Philosophers were Lockeans.
Nor can it be maintained that renewed interest in Locke and English
ideas turned most German philosophes into Anglomaniacs.29 It would

wie der Aufseher iiber eine Gallerie die Bilder, sondern sie ist selbst Mahler und erfindet
und verfertiget neue Gemalde." J. N. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche iiber die
menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1777), 1, 107.
28Tetens, Uber die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie (Biitzow, 1775), 91.
29The most serious offender in this respect is Peter Gay who, in his The Enlightenment, an Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York, 1966-69), overestimates the influence of
English thinkers (Bacon, Newton, Locke) on the Enlightenment, and ignores the pro-
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be foolish to deny that the Germanphilosophes were interested in
Englishculturallife. Apart from the PopularPhilosophers,manyfirstrate minds,such as GottholdEphraimLessing(1729-81), MartinWieland (1733-1813), Johann Joachim Winckelmann(1717-68), Moses
Mendelssohn(1729-86), or Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), were interested in Englandand studiedthe works of Englishthinkers.But to say
that the Germanphilosophes studied Englishlife and thought, and to
say that they were Anglomaniacs,definingtheir own Weltanschauung
in terms of English modes of thought-these are two very different
contentions.
Locke's philosophy, which this essay takes as representativeof
English thought,30never really left a very strong impressionon the
finest minds of the GermanEnlightenment.No one has ever seriously
proposed that Winckelmann,Lessing, Wieland,Wolff, Mendelssohn,
Euler, Lambert, or Kant were Lockeans. There is no evidence that
Winckelmannever read Locke or any other Britishempiricist.Insofar
as he expressedphilosophicconvictions,he was idealisticand Platonic.
Lessing and Wieland were greatly influenced by English literary
models, but owed little to Englandfor the sources of their worldview.
Lessing's Weltanschauungwas Leibnizean, Wieland's was deeply
rooted in ancient Stoicism and Epicureanism.The major German
philosopherssuch as Mendelssohn,Euler,or Lambert,thoughplacing
greater emphasis on empirical elements in their systems, remained
essentiallyloyal to the Leibniz-Wolffschool. EvenTetens,the supposed
"German Locke," was remarkablyfaithful to Leibniz-so much so,
that he tried to devise a system in which Leibnizwould be reconciled
with Englishempiricism.3'
IV. Except for some Popular Philosophers,there were few fullblooded Lockeans,just as there were few Anglomaniacs.Too many
cultural barriersmilitated against the receptionof English modes of
thought,customs, and traditions.In the first place, Germanywas wedded to Frenchculturein such a way as to make intensiveconcernwith
English ideas very difficult.32Throughout most of the eighteenth
found persistence of such other national traditions as that of the German Enlightenment led by Leibniz.
30Leslie Stephen writes that "Locke strikes, in all subjects of which he treats, the
keynote of English speculation in the eighteenth century." Leslie Stephen, History of
English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit., 79.
31This view is also shared by Wilhelm Uebele, who sees Tetens as a mediator between Leibniz and Locke. Wilhelm Uebele, Johann Nicolaus Tetens nach seiner
Gesamtentwicklung betrachtet, mit besonderer Berucksichtigung des Verhiltnisses zu
Kant (Berlin, 1912), 211.
32For the continued predominance of French culture in Germany: Karl Biedermann, Deutschland im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert, 2 vols. in 3 (Leipzig, 1854-80);
Werner Kraus, ed., Die Franz6sische Aufklarung im Spiegel der Deutschen Literatur
des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1963); Betina Strauss, La Culture francaise c Francfort
au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1914); and Eduard Wechssler, "Die Auseinandersetzung des
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centuryFrenchintellectualandinstitutionaltraditionspredominatedin
Germany. In government and administration French influence
continuedunabateduntil the Revolutionof 1789. Many travellersto
Germany were struck by this pervasiveness of French customs.
Governments,for example, were little more than FrenchVersaillesin
miniature.PrussiaunderFrederickthe Greatwas perhapsthe most extremecase. The Prussianmonarchwas imbuedwith Frenchcultureand
surroundedhimself with French advisers, litterateurs, and even tax
farmers.He spokeGerman,as he admittedproudly,only in the manner
of a coachman.His dislikeof the Germanlanguagewas so strongthat,
accordingto one authority,he wouldnot suffera single Germanbook
to be placed in his library.33Frederick'sAcademie des Sciences was
dominatedby the French, and the monarchtook it as a compliment
whenD'Alembertinformedhim that "Heureusement,Sire, votre Academiedes Sciencesne resemblepas au reste de la nation."34
Admittedly,Frederick'sglorificationof Frenchcivilizationwas not
equalledelsewherein Germany.But the Prussianmonarchwas no exception in preferringFrench customs and traditions. These were as
ferventlystudiedand imitatedas they werein the seventeenthcentury.
ChristianThomasius,often called the fatherof the GermanEnlightenment, urgedhis fellow Germansas early as 1687to become more civilized by imitating French manners.35His recommendation was
repeated by many other illustrious Germans, most notably by the
classicist Gottsched, who epitomizedcurrent feelings by his famous
remark, "What the Greeks were to the Romans, the French are to
us."36

Between English and German modes of thought, therefore,stood
the sum of Frenchideas whichGermanyhad inheritedfrom the seventeenth century-the periodof her greatest dependenceon France.The
most visible sign of this influence,apartfrom the factors alreadymentioned,was the predominanceof the Frenchlanguage.This accounts,in
no small measure,for the popularityof Frenchliteraturein Germany.
Leipzigbook cataloguesrevealthat Frenchtitles were as numerousas
Germanones. Newly publishedFrenchbooks weregenerallytranslated
into Germanduringthe veryyear they appearedin Frenchprint.37
Now the impact of Frenchculturerevealeditself in two directions:
deutschen Geistes mit der franz6sischen Aufklarung," Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift
fir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, I, 613-35.
33Biedermann, Deutschland im Achzehnten Jahrhundert, II, 236.
34Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie, I, 362.
35Discurs, welcher Gestalt man denen Franzosen im gemeinen Leben und Wandel
nachahmen solle.
36Quoted by Albert K6ster, Die deutsche Literatur der Aufklarungszeit
(Heidelberg, 1925), 10.
37Werner Kraus, ed., Die Franzosische Aufklrung im Spiegel der deutschen
Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts, CXXXIII.
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in a rationalisticphilosophyand a classicistic literature.Both tendencies, reinforcedby native traditions,dominatedGerman cultural life
until at least 1760.The reactionsagainstthese movementsin the 1770's
was largely nationalisticand owed little, except, perhaps,in literature,
to Englishmodesof thought.38
Frenchrationalism,whichfounda favorablereceptionin Germany,
was not very conduciveto Lockeanempiricism.Thereis no doubt that
Descartes enjoyedfar greater prestigethan Locke in Germanyduring
the first half of the century.The man whointroducedCartesianisminto
Germany was Christian Wolff. The complementary nature of
Wolffianismand Cartesianismhas been much neglected.39Both agreed
that sense experiencerepresentsa lower form of knowledge,that emotional states distort conceptual thought, and that the mathematical
method must be made the touchstone of philosophiccertainty. Both
tended,in addition,to denigratethe kindof experimentalsciencewhich
begins with individualfacts and rises, by degrees, to general concepts
and axioms. Instead, they favoreda priori constructionsto whichfacts
wereassumedto conform.
Several other factors commendedDescartes to the Wolffians.His
defense of innate ideas againstnominalismand sense experiencefitted
in well with Germanschool philosophy.The same was true, thoughto a
lesser extent, of the mind-bodydualism and the rationalisticform of
theology. However,Descartes' mechanismenjoyedfar less popularity,
owingto the fact that modernsciencereplacedthe qualitativemedieval
ideology of science later in Germanythan elsewherein Europe.40This
explains why French materialism, as expoundedby Holbach or La
Mettrie,was regardedin Germanywithunmitigatedhorror.
A far more persistentstumblingblock againstEnglishthoughtwas
the nationalelementin Germanphilosophy.Two things,often complementary, checked the growth of Locke and Englishempiricism:the
first was the multi-dimensionalphilosophyof Leibniz;the second, the
mystical-idealisticstrainin Germanthought.
The philosophyof Leibnizowed its strengthto the way in whichit
affected the German mind in the eighteenthcentury. Duringthe first
half of the centuryit appearedin all its scholastic splendor,thanks to
the effortsof Wolff.WhenWolff's influencedeclined,andLockeanempiricism penetratedGermany,the other part of Leibniz'sphilosophy
38Those who turned against French rationalism in the 1770's, the so-called Sturmer
und Dranger, found much support in English writers: Percy, Ossian, Milton, Young,
and Shakespeare. In no way, however, can it be argued that these English writers
precipitated the movement known as Sturm und Drang.
39Thissubject is briefly touched upon by Robert Sommer, who also notes the similarity between Descartes and Wolff. Robert Sommer, Grundziige einer Geschichte der
Deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik, von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller
(Wtirzburg, 1892), 6ff.
40LewisWhite Beck, Early German Philosophy, op. cit., 182.
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rose to the surface. This was the dynamic, evolutionaryaspect of
Leibniz,so long ignoredby Wolff. Thus, whenWolff's prestigewaned,
Leibniz's philosophy was essentially unaffected. In 1765 Leibniz's
Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain was published for the first

time. It came at a most opportunemoment. Being a subtle point by
point refutation of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding,

it did much to check the incipientgrowth of Lockeanempiricism.The
result of this LeibnizeanRenaissance was that very few German
philosopherssubscribedto the varietiesof Englishempiricism.The socalledGermanempiricists-Feder, Irwing,Tiedemann,or Tetens-are
almost unknowntoday.
There is an additionalconsequenceof the NouveauxEssais which
has not received sufficientnotice, and that is its impact on German
literature.When abstract rationalismbroke down in the 1760's,it was
largely owing to the influenceof Leibniz.LeibnizrevitalizedGerman
literature by stressing the unconscious elements of the soul and by
denyingthe Wolffiandictum that experienceand reason are different
sources of knowledge. Thus the liberation of sensuality in German
literatureowes as much to Leibnizas to foreign sources (Rousseau,
Diderot, Locke). Foreign influences merely reinforceda movement
which had developed on native German soil (Leibniz, Pietism,
Empfindsamkeit).

Leibnizwas, of course, only part of a traditionin Germanthought
dating back to Paracelsusand Meister Eckhart,the mystical-idealistic
tradition, which neither scholasticism nor modern physical science
could suppress. When Newtonian science, of which Locke was the
philosophic spokesman, appeared to conquer all other modes of
thought,the idealistictendencyin Germanygaineda new lease on life.
Its chief task in the eighteenthcentury was to develop a qualitative
ideology of science so that belief in the spiritualelements in man and
Most Germanphilosopherswere appalled
naturecould be preserved.41
the
mechanistic
of
science
becauseit threatenedto reduceman
view
by
to little more than a machine.When Goethe and his fellow students
read Holbach'sSysteme de la nature, they were struck by its morbidness and "shiveredin the manner of those who are frightened by

ghosts."42

Goethe comes at the end of the Enlightenmentand typifies the
resentmentin Germanyagainst the Newtonian universe.Against the
conceptionof natureas lifeless andinerthe opposeda spiritualisticand
vitalisticview. His inspirationwas the evolutionaryaspect of Leibniz's
philosophy.Nature, to Leibniz,was one vast organism,teemingwithvitality andlife. Nature must be conceivedin its evolution,in its ceaseless
4'For the qualitative ideology of science in the Enlightenment: Charles C. Gillispie,
The Edge of Objectivity, An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas (Princeton, 1960).
42Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, op., cit., Bk. 11.
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growth, and in its developmentfrom potentialityto actuality.The idea
that the presentis pregnantwith the future(chargedupasse et gros de
l'avenir) had very fruitful consequences in such fields as history,
biology,literature,andart.
Apart from beingvital or dynamic,natureis also spiritual;and as
such, it contains a purpose that transcendsmere matter of factness.
Here is alreadythe germ of Romanticism,and it is presentin the very
heartof Enlightenmentphilosophy.
In the final analysis,then, there was a powerfulspiritualisticmovement in German philosophywhich stubbornlyresisted the encroachments to British empiricism. This movement spiritualizednature,
endowed the human soul with autonomous spontaneity, affirmed
reason as the highest source of knowledge,and valuedintuitionmore
thancommon sense.
V. By drawingattentionto the influenceof Locke's thoughton the
GermanEnlightenmentwhereit actuallyexisted, and by indicatingthe
kindof obstaclesit encountered,this essay has, I hope,put Locke'shistorical importancein properperspective.Whateverhis influencewas in
Englandor France, it was negligiblein Germany.His philosophicimpact on the GermanEnlightenmentwas alwayslimitedby nativetraditions inimical to his thought. His ideas could not compete with the
Leibniz-Wolffsystem in which all Germanphilosophers,includingthe
Lockean sympathizers,were educated. It is true that around midcenturyand beyondLocke attracteda certainfollowing,but those who
accepted his theories were minor figures and exercised very little
influenceon the futurecourseof Germanphilosophy.
Locke was slightly more fortunatein his religiousand educational
theories,though,here again,nativetraditionsalwaysexerciseda strong
counterpoise.His educationaland religiousideas were acceptedto the
extent that they harmonizedwith local developments.When they did,
as in the case of some German Neologians and Philantropinists,the
problemarises whetherthey directlyinfluencedthe men in questionor
merely reinforced what was already present. Of all the Popular
Philosophers,only Steinbart,Basedow,Feder,Meiners,andTittel were
under the direct spell of Locke-hardly a very impressivegroup of
thinkers.
What, then, remainsof the claim that Locke's influencepervaded
the eighteenthcenturywith a kindof scripturalauthority?Obviously,in
the light of whathas been said, thisjudgmentcannot be seriouslymaintained in the case of Germany. No one denies that Locke was wellknown and widely read in Germany. Being a major European
philosopher,how could it be otherwise?But that he materiallyaffected
the directionof Germanthought,both in the Age of Enlightenmentand
beyond,is a claim that willnot hold up underclose historicalscrutiny.
ChapmanCollege.
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